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A good health economist is a bit like a platypus, or at least so-says a health 
economist colleague of mine.2 The friendly beast must combine a clinician’s 
medical knowledge with an economist’s techniques, both theoretical and 
empirical, and a bureaucrat’s understanding of the administrative structures 
within which policy operates. Perhaps the health economist’s empirical 
techniques are not as refined as the theoretical econometrician’s, just as the 
platypus’s fur is perhaps not quite as soft as that of a kitten, but it does a good 
job of combining a set of characteristics that are normally not found in one 
place. Unfortunately, health policy instead seems set by a chimera that rather 
seems to have taken the design specifications for the platypus and decided that 
the kitten should in fact provide the beak and the duck provide the fur: we 
too often find combined the clinician’s goal of health care, as maximand; the 
economics undergraduate’s captivation by partial equilibrium and neglect of 
general equilibrium; and the bureaucrat’s inadequate respect for methodological 
individualism. The papers in this Agenda Special Issue on health economics 
work to bring more standard economic method back into health policy analysis.
Harrison and Robson lead off by skewering one of the worst such recent chimeras: 
Australia’s National Preventative Health Taskforce. Yes, health is a good thing; 
but it is hardly the only possible element in individual utility functions. Setting 
health as maximand and taking privately borne costs of ill-health as evidence 
of individual irrationality or information failure is unlikely to yield policy 
consistent with good welfare economics. Thus the Taskforce cites smoking as 
generating more than $30 billion per year in ‘costs to the economy’ by relying 
on a study that, by assuming away private consumption benefits of smoking, 
deems privately borne costs to be social loss. The same report deems that alcohol 
costs Australia some $15 billion per year; application of more standard method 
shows that less than $4 billion of that figure consists of costs properly viewed as 
external, with the rest being borne by the drinker himself — and those private 
costs sometimes double-counted.3 But big numbers presented as ‘costs’ imposed 
on the country rather than borne by the consumer help to build a sense of 
public crisis that fuels demand for initiatives like the National Preventative 
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Health Taskforce. The subsequent papers each take on different aspects of the 
interaction between the market for private health insurance and the Australian 
public insurance program, Medicare.
Robson, Ergas and Paolucci take on the Medicare Levy Surcharge [MLS]. A 
naïve economic analysis would suggest such levies are a nice way of ensuring 
that those who can afford their own healthcare either pay for it themselves or 
compensate the government for their use of the public health system. Robson 
et al. instead use standard price theory to show that, because many wealthy 
people would optimally self-insure a higher proportion of their health risks in 
the absence of the MLS, the MLS can have the perverse effect of reducing those 
consumers’ private health insurance purchases if wealth effects are large or, 
alternatively, of buying more insurance than would have been optimal in order 
to avoid the MLS.
Paolucci, Butler and van de Ven build on the analysis of Robson, Ergas and 
Paolucci to argue that the combination of Medicare and private health insurance 
yields inefficient duplication in coverage and that purchasers of private health 
insurance ought to be allowed to opt out of Medicare. Because adverse selection 
might then plague the private health insurance market, the authors argue in 
favour of risk-adjusted subsidies for those privately insured, with private 
insurance then charging identical premiums to all potential customers (as the 
heterogeneity that would give rise to differing insurance charges would be 
covered through subsidy) and mandated to provide minimal benefits packages 
to prevent cream-skimming based on factors observable to the insurer but not 
to the subsidiser.
Finally, Paolucci and Shmueli provide a method for determining an ex-ante 
prospective risk-adjusted subsidy that could be used to implement the model 
proposed by Paolucci, Butler and van de Ven. Currently, private insurers draw 
public subsidy through the claims-equalisation scheme; insurers are constrained 
by regulation not only to take on all potential applicants but also to charge 
a premium that does not reflect individual risk. Adjusting the subsidy for 
individual ex-ante risk characteristics rather than for ex-post claims experience 
may have desirable efficiency characteristics.
Left to be explored is the possibility that the health system as a whole diminishes 
private incentives to engage in health-promoting behaviours. As the financial 
costs of risky behaviour and of unhealthy lifestyles are externalised to those 
providing the subsidy, the National Preventative Health Taskforce might 
find it reasonable to mandate participation in morning exercise, regardless of 
whether the bulk of the effect is pecuniary.4 (Touch your toes, Winston Smith!) 
4 See Browning, E.K. 1999, ‘The Myth of Fiscal Externalities’, Public Finance Review.
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But assuming the mandate is a system that ensures broad access to private 
health insurance, then — rather than mandating community-rated insurance 
premiums and compensating insurers for losses — providing instead lump-sum 
transfers to individuals conditioned on the exogenous elements of their risk 
characteristics while allowing private insurers to charge rates consistent with 
individual risk, could maintain the desired broad accessibility and, at the same 
time, preserve private incentives to make optimal choices among competing 
elements of a utility function broad enough to incorporate both health and 
other goals.
Health economists, duck-billed and otherwise, will find plenty to wrestle with 
in this Special Issue.
